The CMA’s draft VABEO Guidance Consultation

Response of Euclid Law Ltd. to the Consultation on the CMA’s Draft Guidance on the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Order 2022 (CMA154)

We welcome publication of the CMA’s draft guidance on the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Order 2022 (‘VABEO’) (the ‘Draft Guidance’) and the opportunity to comment on it.

Given the shared heritage of the VABEO and the EU Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation (‘VBER’), as well as the extensive precedent in which the VBER and related principles of EU law have been applied in a UK context, we agree with the CMA’s decision to “broadly reflect” the EU’s Vertical Guidelines (the ‘EU Guidelines’) in the Draft Guidance.

While there are some instances where the application of principles developed with the EU’s single market in mind to a UK-specific context can come across as somewhat strained, we agree that prioritising consistency is the right approach at this time.

To read and download the full Response, click here.

Taking Security and Options Seriously: the UK and German Investment Screening Regimes

Arrangements involving current and potential future events, such as taking security and agreeing options, require careful scrutiny under investment screening regimes. It is not safe to assume that a trigger will operate in the same way as under another more developed regulatory regime, such as merger control. Moreover, taking a security or agreeing an option needs to be considered upfront and not just when the security is about to be enforced or the option exercised.

In this piece we consider the position under the UK’s forthcoming National Security & Investment Act (NSI Act) regime and briefly compare this to the position under the recently reformed German regime. We assume that the other requirements for triggering are satisfied and focus on whether a security or an option could in itself take the transaction over the jurisdictional threshold.

Taking security

When a security is actually enforced, then this may well trigger an investment screening regime, as enforcement will typically involve the lender gaining control over the relevant target or its assets which are the subject of the security. The more difficult question, which will likely arise many years earlier at the initial transaction stage, is whether merely taking the security is sufficient.

To download and read the full paper, click here.

Countdown running for entry into force of new UK national security investment screening regime

The UK’s new national security investment screening regime will enter fully into force on 4 January 2022.  From that date, the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (the ‘NSI Act’) will give the Government the power to review a wide range of investments in businesses that are active in the UK or acquisitions of related assets.  While the new regime has the ultimate objective of preventing transactions that could harm the UK’s national security, it will impact a much wider range of deals. 

Under the new regime, investments in entities that are active in the UK in 17 specific sectors will have to be notified to the Government and cleared before completion.  The notification obligation applies regardless of whether the investor is foreign or UK-based and severe civil and criminal penalties will apply if notifiable transactions are not notified.  The underlying transaction will also be void as a matter of English law. 

Although 4 January may feel like a long way off, it is now less than three months away.  The new NSI regime will have a potentially significant impact on timetables and deal certainty for transactions where closing is due to take place after that date.  As a result, it may well be relevant to transactions that are currently being negotiated.  It is also notable that, once the regime is in force, the Government will have the power retrospectively to review and call in any transaction that completed on or after 12 November 2020 (the date on which the bill was originally introduced to Parliament).

Filings will be mandatory where the target is active in any of the following sensitive sectors:

Advanced materialsCritical suppliers to governmentMilitary and dual-use
Advanced roboticsCritical suppliers to the emergency servicesQuantum technologies
Artificial intelligenceCryptographic authenticationSatellite and space technologies
Civil nuclearData infrastructureSynthetic biology
CommunicationsDefenceTransport
Computing hardwareEnergy 

The assessment of whether a qualifying entity is involved in a specified sector will involve careful analysis of the target’s business alongside the relevant statutory definitions. These are extremely detailed and prescriptive, with some running to several pages. 

To download and read the full paper, click here.

UK Competition and Markets Authority Confirms Direction of Travel for Post-Brexit Approach to Vertical Agreements

by Becket McGrath

On 17 June, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) published a keenly awaited consultation document setting out its proposed recommendations to Government for the UK’s new competition law regime for vertical agreements.  Essentially, the CMA is proposing to adopt an approach that remains closely aligned with the EU verticals regime, which is itself about to undergo a refresh to take account of market and legal developments since its last update in 2010.  This is a welcome development, as it should reduce the potential for material divergence between the two regimes, which would reduce legal certainty and increase costs for businesses trading in both the EU and UK.

Background

The need for this consultation has arisen now, as the post-Brexit transitional arrangements for vertical agreements (such as selective and exclusive distribution agreements) are about to expire.  To summarise the legal position, while the UK was an EU Member State the analysis of vertical agreements in UK competition law was largely determined by the EU Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation (‘VBER’).  This sets out the circumstances in which a vertical agreement is protected from challenge under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).  Importantly, the VBER also defines certain ‘hardcore’ restrictions that render an agreement presumptively unlawful.   Together with the accompanying European Commission Guidelines, the VBER effectively serves as a complete code for the treatment of vertical agreements in EU competition law.

[…]

Since the direct application of EU competition law in the UK ceased at the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020, new arrangements were needed urgently to determine the status of vertical agreements in UK competition law from that point.  The immediate solution adopted by the UK Government was essentially to continue the pre-Brexit approach, by incorporating the current EU VBER in UK domestic law, as a ‘retained block exemption’, at least until the VBER’s expiry on 31 May 2022.  Since that date is now approaching, the Government needs to decide what to do.  At the same time, the Commission is part way through its own review of the VBER and Guidelines, as it needs to decide the extent to which the EU regime should be updated after 1 June 2022.

While it may be tempting to continue with the UK’s current approach of aligning completely with EU law in this area (which broadly works), unlike the last time the VBER was reviewed in 2010 UK Government and CMA officials no longer have any input on the text of the EU VBER and Guidelines.  As a result, a decision simply to follow the (revised) EU regime from June 2022, whatever its form, would hardly be a ringing endorsement of the UK’s new found freedom to diverge from EU rules.  On the other hand, the Government and the CMA need to bear in mind that diverging from EU law in this area for its own sake would introduce complexity for the large number of businesses that trade in the UK and EU.  To introduce further complexity, many of the core principles of EU law competition law as applied to vertical agreements rest on EU-specific policy priorities arising from the need to create a single European market.  It was unclear how far these priorities should continue to determine the shape of UK competition law, post-Brexit, especially since the UK is no longer part of the Single Market.  Given this uncertainty, the UK CMA consultation document is an important step forward.

To read about key recommendations and next steps, download the full briefing here.

Sarah Long quoted in GCR article: “UK launches Digital Markets Unit”

On 7 April 2021, the CMA launched its much anticipated Digital Markets Unit (DMU) in shadow form, pending legislation.  The new regulator will sit within the Competition and Markets Authority, with the potential to enforce a code of conduct and impose ‘pro-competition interventions’ in digital markets.

Euclid Law partner Sarah Long commented that the clear intention is for the DMU for have teeth.  However, what remains to be seen is the role of the DMU in mergers.  While it is clear that the DMU is expected to work closely with the CMA enforcement teams to scrutinise digital mergers, the extent of its involvement in either identifying and/or reviewing digital mergers, and the division of labour between the DMU and the CMA’s merger case teams remains unclear. 

Long emphasised that “This will be of importance from a practical perspective as the CMA is already expecting a significant increase in its merger control caseload following the end of the Brexit transition period.”

UK FDI bill consultation responses will aim to narrow sector scope amid new agency capacity concerns

by PaRR

Responses to the UK government’s consultation on mandatory notification under the National Security and Investment Bill published yesterday (11 November) will seek to narrow the proposed sector definitions, lawyers told this news service.

There are also concerns that a new agency within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) tasked with policing the regime will be inundated with deal cases, lawyers noted.

“It is absolutely crucial […] to further refine the list,” Samantha Mobley, competition partner at Baker McKenzie said. Given proposed “draconian penalties” for failure to file, definitions have to be “crystal clear”, she argued.

The government has identified 17 such “core sectors”: advanced materials, advanced robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), civil nuclear, communications, computing hardware, critical suppliers to government, critical suppliers to the emergency services, cryptographic authentication, data infrastructure, defence, energy, engineering biology, military and dual use, quantum technologies, satellite and space technologies and transport.

[…]
Adding new, very broad sectors such as communications, data infrastructure, energy, computing hardware and transport into the existing oversight regime under the Enterprise Act (2002) “has the potential to extend the reach [of FDI screening] considerably,” said Becket McGrath.

To read the full PaRR article: https://lnkd.in/dU3m46A

So… this is Brexit

UK competition law beyond the withdrawal – Part I & II

by Becket McGrath

Since the moment that the result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership in June 2016 was announced, there has been significant uncertainty over when the UK would leave the EU, whether the terms for departure could be agreed in time to avoid a “no deal” exit and even whether Brexit would happen at all. The first part focused on the competition law provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement. These provisions confirm the continued application of EU competition law in the UK during the Brexit transition period, which is currently due to end on 31 December 2020 These uncertainties were ultimately resolved sufficiently to enable Brexit to take place on 31 January 2020.

The second part goes beyond the Withdrawal Agreement which also provides for the continued jurisdiction in the UK of the European Commission and Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) after the end of the transition period for certain matters, including competition investigations that are ongoing at that point and related appeals. Finally, the Northern Ireland Protocol to the Agreement provides for indefinite Commission jurisdiction to supervise UK state aid measures with a potential to affect trade between Northern Ireland and the EU. Assuming that the UK abides by its international law obligations under the Withdrawal Agreement, these aspects of the relationship are now fixed. As a result, the only major area of uncertainty regarding the transition period is whether it will be extended.

To read the rest of this article which was published in Competition Law Insight, click for Part I and Part II.

“CMA Policy: UK Competition Authority Asserts itself in Anticipation of Brexit” comments by Sarah Long

Sarah Long was asked to comment on The Capital Forum’s Vol. 7 No. 300 story published on 15 August 2019 entitled “CMA Policy: UK Competition Authority Asserts Itself in Anticipation of Brexit”.In anticipation of the UK’s imminent exit from the EU, the CMA has adopted an aggressive approach in a bid to secure a better outcome for UK consumers. […] The CMA “will now have an element of freedom to look at mergers in a different way,” said Sarah Long, a partner at Euclid Law in London, adding that the CMA could ultimately move away from the European Commission’s approach in some key respects.

To read the full article, click here.

Something is happening in UK merger control … despite Brexit

One would be forgiven for concluding that the only thing that is happening in the UK is Brexit.  However, there are some interesting ideas being considered, either in the context of Brexit or perhaps more precisely despite Brexit.  The political paralysis that the country has suffered could come to an end quite quickly and the inevitable ministerial reshuffle could re-invigorate the process. 

With the appointment (on 20 June 2018) of Andrew Tyrie as Chairman of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the body is now backed by a political heavyweight and those who followed his work as the Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee know that he means business for consumers.  Tyrie wasted no time in setting out his agenda in a well-publicised letter to the Secretary of State.

The core aspect for merger control is that with the increase in mergers after Brexit, a compulsory notification system with a standstill provision is being mooted. 

The accompanying CMA document explains as follows:

“Brexit could have important implications for merger control UK, in part because the CMA will need to review a larger number of multi-jurisdictional mergers that would previously have been considered by the European Commission. The existing rules, whereby firms notify the CMA of mergers on a voluntary basis, may need amendment, so that the CMA can work effectively with international counterparts. With this in mind, proposals are made to require mandatory notifications of mergers above a certain threshold, accompanied by a “standstill obligation” designed to prevent parties from proceeding with the transaction prior to the CMA’s approval (page 42 in the letter). It is also proposed that higher or full cost recovery from merging parties be reconsidered (the CMA currently recovers around half the cost of its mergers work from fees paid by merging parties, page 43 in the letter).”

The final statement on merger fees is also interesting in that the UK already has the highest merger fees in Europe.  At the moment, the level of fees is based on the turnover of the target, which often has no relationship to the complexity or indeed cost of the review.  Any change could have a chilling effect on smaller mergers in concentrated industries – which may of course be part of the CMA’s objective, even if that is not the most appropriate tool.

In the footnotes to the letter you can also find a suggestion that in digital markets the CMA should have a special power to look at the effect of successive acquisitions by the same company in the round rather than individually – and importantly a special regime whereby certain companies have to report acquisitions to the CMA as a matter of course.  This latter power is clearly aimed at the digital platforms and has to be read in the context of the conclusions of the Furman report, which can be found here.

In that report the Digital Competition Expert Panel made a number of far-reaching recommendations, including:

“Our recommendations also update merger policy to protect consumers and innovation, preserving competition for the market. Central to updating merger policy is ensuring that it can be more forward-looking and take better account of technological developments. This will require updated guidance about how to conduct these assessments based on the latest economic understanding, and updated legislation clarifying the standards for blocking or conditioning a merger. We believe that the correct application of economic analysis would result in more merger enforcement. This would be welcome given that historically there has been little scrutiny and no blocking of an acquisition by the major digital platforms. This suggests that previous practice has not had any ‘false positives’, blocking mergers that should have been allowed, while it may well have had ‘false negatives’, approving mergers that should not have been allowed.”

We may well see legislative change to deal with forward-looking mergers in technology and in particular so-called “killer-acquisitions”, a phrase coined by Cunningham, Ederer and Ma in their paper looking at pipeline pharmaceutical acquisitions – available here.  Although their study was limited to the pharma sector, the principles are now being considered in the context of digital markets and particularly where digital platforms buy up potential competitors before they can potentially become threatening.  This would deal with the 400+ acquisitions that digital platforms have made in recent years.

Change is on its way and this one could make the UK merger regime divert very significantly from its EU counterpart – and ironically place more pressure on reforming the latter. 

What is apparent is that deal or no deal, there will be a parallel merger control system in the UK, which will have its own features, timings and costs – and most larger mergers will be caught by both.  At the moment the UK has a “voluntary” system, but in practice mergers that raise issues in the UK will need to be filed in the UK.  The reason for that is very simple: under UK merger control, the CMA can intervene in a merger within 4 months of closing.  If it does so, it has the ability to impose stringent hold-separate obligations and it has the power to fine the company if those are not respected.  That is a risk that few companies will want to take, especially if there is a prospect of the target being left isolated and rudderless under a hold-separate for extended periods of time.  The Phase II process in the UK is particularly drawn out and painful and this is a risk that few purchasers are willing to accept.  A second ancillary point is that the UK process is very much driven by third party submissions and complaints, which increases the uncertainties in relation to mergers.  Often problems can arise in a very small area (for example in a recent deal that Euclid Law advised on, it was one single bottling line), which can then have significant implications for the rest of the deal.

On balance, it is often better to include a condition precedent in the deal and to notify a merger than to take the risk of a post-closing intervention by the CMA.  If the target is hotly contested, in an auction sale, for example, that may not always be possible, and it is not uncommon for purchasers to take the competition risk in the transaction where that is strictly necessary.  Early strategic advice on the options is clearly crucial in this area, as the CMA is likely to impose hold-separate obligations even where the risk of Phase II is very low.

One important aspect of UK merger control is the CMA’s ability to determine when a merger can be filed by declaring the notification complete.  This is different from the EU process, where the parties can ultimately decide the point of filing and the Commission would have to declare the notification incomplete after filings.  This power gives the CMA the ability to manage its own caseload.  The CMA also has the power to stop the clock if information requests to the parties are not complied with and it has used those powers in the recent past.

It is therefore appropriate to conclude that whatever the outcome of Brexit, the CMA will become a leading player in global merger control, probably on a par with other reputable agencies.  The Commission will have to adapt to dealing with the CMA as an equal rather than as a subordinated NCA under Regulation 1/2003.  This may involve the negotiation of a bilateral agreement, such as the one with Switzerland.  However, unlike Switzerland, the UK is unlikely to wait politely for the Commission to take a merger decision first and follow it.  Whereas the Commission is likely to be more influenced by the ordoliberal thinking in Germany and France, it is likely that the UK will develop an increasingly “dynamic” view of competition, especially in relation to forward-looking merger control.  Divergence is an inevitable consequence of that process. 

The CMA will inevitably need to evolve into a regime that is compatible with merger control regimes in the EU and the US.  Dialogue with Brussels will be key, as many companies operate a single integrated European business across jurisdictions.  This is particularly relevant if the parties need to structure global or EEA-wide remedies. 

The human factor in all of this cannot be underestimated as the future relationship between CMA and EU Commission will be shaped by mutual trust (or perhaps distrust) between the key decision makers.  The European elections and the new Competition Commissioner could have a significant impact on this dynamic.

Regardless of whether the Brexit date is 29 March 2019 or a later date, any large merger will have to be examined in both regimes on a forward-looking basis.  Without a deal, the CMA will become fully competent on Brexit day.  With a deal, that process may be delayed. However, the UK merger regime should not be underestimated and a parallel approach in Brussels and London will become the order of the day.  Chairman Andrew Tyrie is well aware of the opportunity and will use it to set the political tone.  His letter is well worth reading.

Oliver Bretz

A Brexit survival guide for lawyers (by Oliver Bretz)

Is it really that bad? Business is going well, the weakness of sterling is benefiting UK service industries and law firms are seeing new instructions as companies, banks and individuals try to work out the legal implications of Brexit.

However, there is an icy chill in the air. One can feel the temperature falling as trainee numbers are cut, firms look for merger opportunities and partners have a sense of unease about the future.

The problem is that law firms have multiple challenges, not only legal and regulatory, but also commercial. As firms rushed to requalify lawyers in Ireland, it became apparent that the practice of law is complex and requires many freedoms to continue to exist in its current form.

You can read the full article at: https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice-points/a-brexit-survival-guide-for-lawyers/5059955.article