Category: Publications

This paper is to analyse the competitive dynamics between news publishers and digital platforms. News publishers and digital platforms are vertical complements in that news publishers publish content that helps digital platforms to attract users. In turn, digital platforms generate traffic for news publishers. However, the relationship between news publishers and digital platforms is not harmonious. While digital platforms are an important source of traffic, news publishers are concerned that digital platforms free-ride on their valuable content, but also that that distribute that content in a manner that commoditizes it, hence harming their brands. News publishers and digital platforms also horizontally compete for user attention and advertising revenues. Internet users in search of news can go to the website or app of their favourite newspaper, but they may also go to Google News, Facebook or Twitter. Similarly, advertisers can spend their online advertising budget on news …

Online display advertising, whereby publishers display visual-based advertisements (e.g. texts, images or videos) on their website against remuneration, represents a large source of revenues for publishers, large and small, offering valuable content to Internet users. But for online display advertising, many such publishers would not subsist, and the Internet would be impoverished. Display advertising is also critical to advertisers, in particular when they seek to raise “brand awareness” among consumers.Because of its vital importance to advertisers and publishers, healthy competition in the advertising ecosystem is desirable. Yet, despite the spectacular growth of online display advertising, the picture is not entirely rosy. In the “programmatic” era, where ad inventory is sold through computerized decision-making processes managed by “ad tech” intermediaries, the online display advertising sector is characterized by a high degree of opacity, and publishers and advertisers …

On 15 October 2014, the European Commission adopted a decision finding that Slovak Telekom breached Article 102 TFEU for its refusal to provide unbundled access to its local loops, as well as its margin squeeze of alternative operators in the provision of unbundled access to its local loops. On 13 December 2018, GCEU adopted its judgement on the appeal brought by Slovak Telekom. The GCEU confirms the Commission’s decision that the Slovak Telekom had breached Article 102 TFEU by engaging in constructive refusal to supply and margin squeeze. This paper reviews the main arguments that ST raised in its appeal against the Commission decision, and analyses the response of the GCEU to these arguments, and in the process provides commentary and critique on the GCEU judgment. It argues that this judgement is a missed opportunity as it fails to engage with the fundamental issues of principles raised by Slovak Telekom in its appeal.

The European Commission introduced in its 2006 revision of the Leniency programme the concept of ‘marker’ which is a temporary protection for potential leniency applicants while they prepare a full leniency application. The object of the marker is to grant companies some predictability on the level of immunity they will obtain once they submit the full application and to induce earlier leniency applications by inducing competition between potential applicants. However, the marker system is not actually being used in the case of complex cartels where the Commission is unable to establish criteria to implement it. The solution in these cases is not to skip the marker system but to improve it to make it effective.

Interim measures have the potential to be an effective and cost-efficient way for businesses with limited budgets to change the behaviour of companies that raise competition concerns. The threshold for interim measures was lowered in the UK, and the UK competition authority (the CMA) has made clear it is open to receiving more applications. The CMA dealt with an application for interim measures in the online auction services case, which ultimately resulted in the company under investigation offering commitments. However, the procedural and evidentiary standards for a successful interim measures case remain high and applicants should not underestimate the burden and cost of embarking on the process. This paper considers these issues, with particular focus on the implications for business of making an application for interim measures or defending one, as a company subject to a complaint.

Following Brexit, if the UK is no longer a member of the European Economic Area, then there will be no ‘one stop shop’ for mergers at the EU level and a separate merger review may need to be carried out in the UK. This means merger notifications may be required in both the EU and the UK. This would result in a significant increase in transaction costs, time and administration, in addition to the risk of potential uncertainty as companies face possibly divergent or inconsistent decisions.

Along with London, New York, Frankfurt and Singapore, the financial district of Hong Kong has always played a major role in the global financial services industry. Despite its small size, Hong Kong is well integrated into the financial networks that drive the global economy. In wholesale and investment banking the market players tend to be global businesses with diverse commercial interests. Any transaction in Hong Kong is likely to affect businesses elsewhere and vice versa. In recent years there has been a significant spotlight on the way that financial markets operate, and the Libor settlement in the US as well as the more recent Forex settlement have shown the role that competition law has to play in ensuring the proper functioning of financial markets. Competition law is not in conflict with regulatory objectives. To the contrary, it can be a useful additional tool to ensure that markets remain open and competitive. Competition law and policy need to become part of the …